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More important, Mr. Olmert received just enough presidential support for his main initiative — another unilateral pullback of Israeli settlers, from a large portion of the West Bank — to satisfy an Israeli public that craves American approval and respect.
Mr. Bush hailed Mr. Olmert's "bold ideas" and said they "could be an important step toward the peace we both support."
But those around Mr. Olmert were a little disappointed, too, that the American embrace of what Mr. Olmert is calling realignment was so tepid and conditional, especially given that the task of pulling some 70,000 Israeli settlers out of the West Bank will dwarf, in emotional cost as well as numbers, the much-praised withdrawal from the Gaza Strip last summer.
Mr. Bush insisted first on a sincere effort to restart serious negotiations toward peace with the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and of course Mr. Olmert said that was what he wanted, too.
Mr. Olmert had praise in Washington for Mr. Abbas, in sharp contrast to his earlier descriptions of the Palestinian as powerless, helpless and "unable to take charge of his own government," as he told CNN last week. Mr. Olmert's deputy and foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, has gone so far as to call Mr. Abbas irrelevant now that Hamas, which refuses to recognize Israel or forswear violence, is running the Palestinian Authority.
With "no partner" for peace, Israel has argued, it has no choice but to move ahead unilaterally to set its own borders and pull its settlers back within them.
But here Mr. Olmert got caught in one of the newer paradoxes of the Middle East. The victory of Hamas, considered a terrorist group, has complicated Israel's ability to carry out its plans, not simplified it.
The United States and the European Union, unable and unwilling to deal with Hamas, have a vital interest in preserving an alternative to Hamas, maintaining their contacts with the Palestinian people and assuring them that the world remains committed, despite Hamas, to an independent, viable, contiguous Palestinian state in negotiated borders.
The impossibility of dealing with Hamas has made Mr. Abbas, however weak, indispensable to the West. He is duly elected, recognizes Israel and opposes terrorism. So the United States wants to boost Mr. Abbas, not diminish him, and is therefore insisting that Mr. Olmert treat him with respect, as a negotiating partner, rather than treat him with the indifference and contempt shown by the former Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon.
Even many in Israel wonder if Hamas would have won the legislative elections in January had Mr. Sharon coordinated the transfer of Gaza publicly with Mr. Abbas, to make it seem to be his accomplishment, instead of tossing the keys to Gaza into the street.
At the same time, though, senior American officials have few expectations that Mr. Abbas can deliver, so there is an element of hypocrisy on both sides. And both the Americans and the Israelis are concerned about getting deep into negotiations, on final-status issues like Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees, that are unlikely to succeed, possibly prompting another round of violence like the intifada, or uprising, that followed the failure of President Clinton's peace efforts in 2000.
As Mr. Olmert told Congress, trying to set the bar high, he will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority if it "renounces terrorism, dismantles its terrorist infrastructure, accepts previous agreements and recognizes Israel's right to exist." If not, "we will not give a terrorist regime a veto over progress," he said.
"The United States has a pretty keen understanding of what Abbas can and can't deliver," said David Makovsky, director of a project on Middle East peace efforts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "But Olmert's timeline is finite and Abbas's ability to deliver is very finite, so there's a kind of Middle Eastern two-step. Everyone will pay lip service to negotiations, but the reality will be more like coordination."
The Palestinians, through Mr. Abbas, must at least be "given a voice and even a vote" in the Israeli withdrawal plan, Mr. Makovsky said, "but not a veto."
Robert Malley, a former Clinton negotiator who is now the Middle East program director at the International Crisis Group, noted that calendars coincide in Washington and Jerusalem. The Israelis need at least until the end of the year, consulting with Washington, to turn their ideas into a workable plan, allowing a period for talks.
"For the United States it's important not to let Israel jump into unilateralism and to give negotiations a try," Mr. Malley said. "Something good could come from them. They may help Abbas in struggles with Hamas, and they could help the Americans in the region."
At the same time, he said, if talks fail, then Washington can endorse Mr. Olmert's refined withdrawal plan.
The big question, Mr. Malley said, is what the talks with Mr. Abbas will be about. The Israelis want to discuss security and dismantling militant groups, "issues on which Mr. Abbas is least capable now of delivering," Mr. Malley said.
Mr. Abbas wants to talk about final-status issues, on which he can deliver his signature, but the Israelis do not want to start such talks until the Palestinians have dismantled militant groups.
"So can they find something where Abbas can show he can deliver and the Israelis feel it's a benefit?" Mr. Malley asked. "It's not clear."
Given the short shelf life of Israeli governments, and the amount of time left in Mr. Bush's second term, Mr. Olmert returns from his successful first trip to Washington with a sense of urgency.
He gained a strong but provisional vote of confidence and a major challenge: to turn his "bold ideas" into a workable plan in coordination with Washington and Mr. Abbas without getting sucked into a meandering negotiation that leads into the sand.
